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The cultural, economic and political crisis affecting the European 
Union (EU) today is manifested in the political community’s lack 
of enthusiasm and cohesion. An effort to reverse this situation – 
foster ‘EU identity’ – was the creation of EU citizenship. Citizen- 
ship implies a people and a polity. But EU citizens already belong 
to national polities. Should EU citizenship override national citi- 
zenship or coexist with it? Postnationalists like Habermas have 
suggested EU citizenship can overcome nationalisms, grounding 
political belonging on the body of laws that members of the post- 
national polity generate in the public sphere. Cosmopolitan com- 
munitarianists like Bellamy, by contrast, think that EU citizens 
should form a mixed commonwealth, with political belonging 
based on national citizenship. I will argue in favour of the second 
option, and submit an analogical reading of the ensuing ideas of 
citizenship, identity and polity. Cosmopolitan communitarianist 
EU citizenship promises to better foster the great richness of Eu- 
ropean national cultural, religious, historical, political, legal and 
linguistic diversity in a ‘mixed’ polity. Its main challenge is how to 
keep the diverse, mixed polity together. 
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Lack of EU identity in the context of 
Europe’s existential crisis 
he European motto established in 2000 is ‘united in di- 
versity’. In political terms, this means that Europe – or 
more precisely, the European Union (EU) – wishes to be 
one polity while maintaining and respecting the rich diver- 
sity of its members (states and citizens). Diversity is evident 
in aspects like culture, language, history, religion, geography, 
political traditions and so forth. But what can give the EU1 
unity? 
The European Political Community failed in 1954. In 1970 
European Political Cooperation was introduced. In 1992 the 
European Community became part of the European Union. 
Still, enthusiasm for political integration among the popula- 
tion of the nascent EU was not great. Europe as a political 
project seemed to be in crisis (Cerutti 2005; Weiler 1999). 
Some argued then and even today that the crisis was not only 
political, but existential as well – threatening the very foun- 
dations of Europe (Ratzinger 2007; Ratzinger & Pera 2006; 
Weigel 2005a; Weiler 1999, 2003). These discussions posed 
questions such  as  ‘What  is  Europe?’,  ‘Where  does  Europe 
end?’, ‘Who can be considered a European?’, ‘What do Euro- 
peans have in common?’: questions of European identity. 
For Ratzinger (2007), the work of European integration 
had two goals. The first was to overcome the divisive nation- 
alistic movements and hegemonic ideologies that had precip- 
itated World War II. The second was to present a unified front 
that served as a political counterbalance to the two great 
powers of the Cold War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Often the term ‘Europe ’  
is used as shorthand for 
‘European   Union’   as   if 
they were interchangeable. 
Some authors and even of- 
ficial documents use this 
convention. I do not en- 
dorse this confusion. The 
European Union certainly 
encompasses more than 
half of the European coun- 
tries,  but  still  ‘European 
Union’  is  not  a  synonym 
for  ‘Europe ’.  Ukraine,  Ice- 
land and Croatia are as 
European as any Member 
State of the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The way of peace (the first goal of integration) as the com- 
mon identity of Europeans and the common path towards 
the future was grounded on the common cultural, moral and 
religious heritage of Europe (Ratzinger 2007). The founding 
fathers were seeking an EU identity that would link national 
identities to higher level of unity, into a ‘community of peo- 
ples’ (Ratzinger 2007: 36). Judeo-Christianity and the En- 
lightenment were central to that cultural, moral and religious 
heritage as it was perceived by the founding fathers of EU 
integration (Ratzinger 2007). The Christianity that played a 
role in this unification had a non-denominational 
The  founding fathers 
were seeking an EU 
identity that would 
link national identi- 
ties  to  higher  level 
of unity, into a ‘com- 
munity    of    peoples’. 
form. Casanova (2004) claims that the Europe- 
an projects reconciled Protestants and Catholics 
within a Christian democracy. But even more, the 
religious component of Europe’s historical identity 
was perceived as compatible with the moral ideals 
of the Enlightenment, since they shared a common 
rationality (Ratzinger 2007). 
The second goal of integration, the creation of 
a political counterbalance to other powers in the 
world stage, demanded that Europeans became a prominent 
economic player. This was where the common identity – 
founded on the moral background that all Europeans shared 
– met with an affirmation of common interests as well. How- 
ever, it seems that the first goal – peace – has received less 
attention and that the second goal – prosperity – has become 
progressively more dominant in the last 50 years (Ratzinger 
2007). 
The crisis in European integration under Ratzinger’s read- 
ing could be traced back, therefore, to two imbalances: firstly, 
the importance that has been given to only one of the two 
core elements of Europe’s culture (the Enlightenment over 
Judeo-Christianity); secondly, the attention that has been 
paid to only one of the two goals of integration (economic 
prosperity over peace and reconciliation). 
That historical reading of the crisis is only one of at least 
three alternative readings. One of great relevance is the eco- 
nomic perspective: the Greek crisis, the amounts of debt in 
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‘Southern’ European countries as well in others like the Unit- 
ed Kingdom and Belgium, the pressures over the euro, are 
all elements that make the crisis sharper, especially for those 
who see the EU mainly as an economic club. A second reading 
is the perspective of those (Caldwell 2009; Ferguson 2004; 
Glenn 2008; Weigel 2005b) who see Europe as a continent 
in cultural decadence, bound for eventual disappearance, 
stressing among other phenomena that of birth rates below 
the replacement level (United Nation 2010). A third reading 
is political, and sees the crisis in Europe as the lack of legiti- 
macy caused by a democratic deficit that must be addressed 
(Eriksen 2005, 2009; Ruzza & Della Sala 2007). 
Under this third reading,2 EU identity has been approached 
in at least two senses. One, as the problem of defining the po- 
litical form of the EU: some consider it an intergovernmen- 
tal organisation, others a future federation and others a new 
kind of polity altogether.3 Second, as the problem of finding 
the polity’s source of cohesion: what makes – or can make – 
the EU a ‘union’ from the political point of view? A search for 
commonalities  (‘Europeanness’)  has  grasped  the  attention 
not only of academics, but also of politicians in individual 
countries and EU-wide. EU identity in either of these senses 
was investigated officially or semi-officially in, for example, 
the ‘Document on European identity’ (1973), the ‘Reflections 
on European Identity’ (Jansen 1999), or the Laeken Declara- 
tion on the future of the European Union (2001). 
Efforts to foster an EU identity have included the creation 
of symbols such as a European flag, a European anthem, a Eu- 
rope Day, a European currency (the euro), a European motto 
and a European citizenship (Curti Gialdino 2005; Jacobs & 
Maier 1998). In this paper I will focus on the latter. 
 
EU citizenship & political identity: 
the demos & telos problems 
itizenship is the cornerstone of a democratic polity 
(Weiler 1999). It provides a sense of belonging in a 
political community, rights derived from membership 
and duties of participation (Leydet 2006). Thus it has three 
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2 Though the cultural, eco- 
nomic and social perspec- 
tives are also relevant if 
citizenship means not only 
a source of rights and du- 
ties but also participation 
in the polity ’s affairs and a 
shared sense of belonging 
– or identity. 
3 Chryssochoou (2009: 6-
14)  calls  it  a  ‘social  sci- 
entific    puzzle’.    Former 
president of the European 
Commission, Jacques De- 
lors, once called it an ‘un- 
identified  political  object’  
(Müller 2004). 
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4 As we shall see towards 
the end of the paper, 
Weiler (1999) has in mind 
a third and no less impor- 
tant problem, that of the 
ethos of integration. 
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dimensions: identitarian, or a sense of belonging; legal rights 
and duties; and political participation (Bellamy 2008; Leydet 
2006). 
Citizens constitute the polity’s demos, its ‘people’, which 
often coincides with a nation (Weiler 1999). Since EU citizen- 
ship was introduced with the purpose of enhancing ‘Europe- 
an identity’ (Treaty on European Union 1992), understood as 
Europeans’ sense of belonging to their political community 
(Weiler 1999), such citizenship created at least two prob- 
lems. 
The first problem is: What demos is EU citizenship based 
on? Is there a European demos, a ‘people’? Where does the new 
situation leave the nations – peoples, demoi – of the Member 
States? Has the plan of an ‘ever closer union’ not been one 
thought for ‘the peoples of Europe’ (Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the Union 2000)? 
The second problem is this: If citizens are by definition 
members of a political community, to what kind of polity do 
EU citizens belong? And how does that polity relate to the 
existing Member States? Does it substitute them or assume 
them as in a federation? Is it a new kind of polity? Some have 
called this the telos problem.4 
 
In the beginning: national identity 
and citizenship 
here were voices of concern about the creation of a Eu- 
ropean citizenship (Grimm 2005; Kymlicka 2001; Mill- 
er 1998; Offe 2006; Smith 1992) who pointed out that 
citizenship had its place in nation-states, which were about 
the largest communities within which the identitarian as- 
pect of citizenship (membership, belongingness) still makes 
sense. EU citizenship implied the creation of another demos 
whose telos (a super-nation) either threatened European na- 
tion-states or simply was not going to work (Miller 1998). 
This position is insightful into the way in which citizenship 
has been devised and has worked in contemporary democra- 
cies (Miscevic 2005). There is a strong link between national 
identity and citizenship. 
 
 
OPEN CITIZENSHIP VOLUME 1, AUTUMN 2010 
 Membership in a polity confers rights, implies duties of 
participation and makes citizens ‘part of the club’. Citizen- 
ship creates a bond of unity between the members of the po- 
litical community: all of them possess equal rights, are ruled 
and rule through political participation, and can develop a 
sense of belonging among strangers without threatening 
what makes each of them different (Leydet 2006). In other 
words, citizenship successfully allows the fulfilment of unity 
in diversity. Yet there are certain elements that contribute 
to the political community’s shared identity: a language that 
everybody speaks, a common history, a landscape, perhaps a 
religious tradition and others. 
But the EU is too big and its Member States (and peo- 
ples) are too diverse to make citizenship workable. For peo- 
ple across Europe ‘the nation remains [the] primary focus of 
political identity and allegiance’ (Miller 1998: 49). Democ- 
racy will only be possible where all members of society have 
a voice in public discussion. This is very difficult without a 
common language: English is spoken as a second language by 
the elites, but not by all Europeans (Miller 1998). 
Besides, democracy works when each participating group 
moderates its demands in order to reach a compromise that 
everyone will accept. Every participant must be willing to 
comply with the outcome even when they are not on the win- 
ning side, knowing that their voice has been taken seriously. 
In other words, a successful democracy presupposes trust and 
confidence from each member of the political community in 
the rest of the participants, something more likely to happen 
among people who share a common national identity, speak 
the same language and possess broadly similar cultural values 
(Miller 1998). 
Social justice too, requires people to restrain their own 
demands, be fair in their dealings with, and make sacrifices 
for, other members of the political community. For Miller 
(1998), there is abundant evidence that citizens will be more 
willing to support redistribution and afford equal treatment 
to others if they perceive them to share the same values and 
identity, as happens in nations (48). 
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From this perspective, EU citizenship presents poor pros- 
pects. But these reflections deserve attention since they are 
based on what has been the experience of citizenship so far, 
much more successful in national polities than in multina- 
tional ones. 
Two approaches argue for citizenship beyond the nation- 
state. They involve different ideas about the demos and the 
telos questions. We will look first at the one that seems to 
have more adherents in the academic literature. 
Postnational citizenship 
ostnationalists, or procedural cosmopolitanists (Delan- 
ty 1997; Fossum 2003; Habermas 2001a, 2001b, 2006; 
Longo 2008), see EU citizenship as a new, cosmopoli- 
tan form of belonging, which protects Europe from the risks 
of nationalism – all too evident in its recent history – and 
sets the conditions for ‘the people of Europe’ – its demos – 
to build a post-national polity (telos) through deliberation 
and attachment to civic values. EU citizenship ought to be 
enhanced from its present form into a fully-fledged postna- 
tional citizenship (Habermas 2001a, 2001b, 2006). 
For Habermas (2001b) the emergence of a ‘Federal States 
of Europe’ (89) – a postnational polity on the way to global 
governance – is possible only if political communities can 
form a collective identity beyond national borders, thus 
grounding the conditions of legitimacy for a ‘postnational de- 
mocracy ’ (90). European citizens will have to learn ‘to mutu- 
ally recognize one another as members of a common political 
existence beyond national borders’ (Habermas 2001b: 98) in 
such a way that ‘Swedes and Portuguese are prepared to stand 
up for each other’, exercising a ‘civil solidarity that leads to 
the setting of – for example – roughly equivalent minimum 
wages’ (Habermas 2003: 97). 
Against sceptics signalling the impossibility of a ‘Europe- 
an people’ being created, Habermas (2001b) points out that 
such an enterprise is difficult only if ‘people’ depends on a 
‘pre-political community of fate’ (a nation), who are solidary 
to each other because a state authority imposes on them that 
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 duty which they place above their own preferences (101). But 
the normative self-understanding of the modern constitu- 
tional state is that of ‘an uncoerced association of legal con- 
sociates’, in such a way that 
[t]he citizens of a democratic legal state under- 
stand themselves as the authors of the law, which 
compels them to obedience as its addressees. 
Unlike morality, positive law construes duties as 
something secondary; they arise only from the 
compatibility of the rights of each other with the 
equal rights of all (Habermas 2001b: 101). 
Habermas (2001b) recognises the nation as ‘the first mod- 
ern form of collective identity’ (101); yet the different paths 
that the emergence of nation-states took in Europe – from 
state to nation (for example France) or from nation to state 
(for example Germany) – attest ‘to the constructed character 
of this new identity formation’ (102). Civic solidarity among 
strangers was generated thanks to ‘a highly abstractive leap 
from the local and dynastic to national and then to democrat- 
ic consciousness’, and there is no reason why this learning 
process should not continue supported by the European par- 
ty system that departing from the national arenas develops ‘a 
debate on the future of Europe and in the process articulates 
interests that cross national borders’ (Habermas 2001b: 102- 
103) and finds resonance 
in a pan-European political public sphere that 
presupposes a European civil society complete 
with interest groups, non-governmental organi- 
zations, citizens’ movements, and so forth… The 
normative impulses that first set these different 
processes in motion from their scattered nation- 
al sites will themselves only come about through 
overlapping projects for a common political cul- 
ture… in the common historical horizon that 
the citizens of Europe already find themselves in 
(Habermas 2001b: 103). 
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5   Bellamy’s   position   is 
inspired  on  Pettit’s  neo- 
republicanism, different 
from Habermasian pro- 
ceduralism and Rawlsian 
contractarianism. 
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In the experiences of overcoming particularisms and con- 
flicts among Europeans, Habermas (2001b) sees successful 
forms of social integration that have shaped ‘the normative 
self-understanding of European modernity into an egalitar- 
ian universalism’ and can ease the transition to postnational 
democracy for ‘all of us – we, the sons, daughters, and grand- 
children of a barbaric nationalism’ (103). 
 
Cosmopolitan communitarianist 
citizenship 
osmopolitan communitarianists, such as Bellamy,5 
Castiglione and Walreigh, take a middle position be- 
tween nationalism and postnationalism. To them, EU 
citizenship should be perfected in its present form but not 
substantially changed. Existing alongside the national kind, 
EU citizenship allows citizens to maintain their main source 
of political identification – belonging to their respective na- 
tions – and at the same time opens for them the benefits of a 
supranational atmosphere. 
If Europe is to maintain the richness of its diversity, it 
should  continue  on  the  path  of  a  ‘mixed  commonwealth’ 
(Bellamy & Castiglione 2003) – neither an intergovernmen- 
tal organisation, like in the past, nor a federation, as some 
envisage its future (Bellamy & Walreigh 1998b) – with sev- 
eral demoi, drawing from the different cultural, linguistic and 
legal traditions of the Member States and, at the same time, 
keeping each other in check as a way to avoid the dangers of 
nationalism. EU citizenship should be kept and perfected in 
its present form (Bellamy 2008). 
Bellamy and Warleigh (1998a) argue that the EU’s ‘hy- 
bridity can be sustained and developed by supplementing the 
elite-driven process and granting a greater political role to EU 
citizens’ (447). As the normative foundation of this multi- 
level polity, they propose an ‘ethics of participation… [n]either 
supranationally cosmopolitan nor communitarianly state- 
centric’:  a  ‘cosmopolitan  communitarianism’  (Bellamy  & 
Walreigh 1998b: 448), attending to the original inspiration 
contained in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome (1957), that 
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 of ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. Ac- 
cordingly, Bellamy (2006) proposes ‘to leave the distinct peo- 
plehood of the various Member States intact’ (118). 
He was against the drafting of a constitution in 2003, 
since a sort of constitution already existed in the acquis com- 
munautaire, which combines ‘a neo-republican form of gov- 
ernance with the evolution of a European common law… 
better suited to the EU’s character as an evolving polity’ that 
‘ought to be improved and enhanced, not replaced’ (Bellamy 
2006: 122). 
For Bellamy (2008), the degree of belonging necessary   
to create an EU-wide demos is lacking, and rights cannot fill 
this gap, for democratic participation on EU matters will be 
meaningful to EU citizens if they are regarded as part of a 
‘poly-centric polity and multi-levelled regime’, as a demoi-cra- 
cy in which EU policies are debated at the national and even 
subnational realms, so that EU politics ‘be brought down to 
the levels that make sense for people’ (608). He points out 
that this is the way EU politics currently works, with EU is- 
sues being framed by national debates rather than as the fo- 
cus of transnational movements (Bellamy 2008). 
Political participation of EU citizens should be seen as 
‘nested in, rather than autonomous from, national citizen- 
ship’, since ‘democratic legitimacy is largely lent to the EU 
through the old forms of democratic citizenship that prevail 
in the Member States’ rather than due to mechanisms of its 
own, 
European citizenship must continue to be but an 
adjunct to national citizenship. Bringing the one 
more firmly under the scrutiny of the other, par- 
ticularly with regard to decisions by the Court 
and other unelected bodies, and to some degree 
limiting the scope for European integration it- 
self, provides the only viable way to enhance de- 
mocracy within the EU (Bellamy 2008: 609). 
A truly common dimension will grow only if the EU re- 
spects and works with nations, not if it tries to overcome 
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 them: citizens are more likely to treat European matters seri- 
ously if they perceive them as an intrinsic part of domestic 
politics and not belonging to an altogether separate polity 
different from theirs (Bellamy 2006). 
In clear disagreement with Habermas regarding the dem- 
os question, Bellamy (2006) points out that there is no com- 
mon European language and hence no pan-European media. 
Partially because of this, there is no shared political culture: 
in fact, concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, and 
others are understood differently in each Member State. Fi- 
nally, within a vast electorate, ‘in the absence of a common 
language and culture of politics and hence of any meaning- 
ful European public sphere’, citizens feel 
there is no shared political 
culture: in fact, concepts 
such as ‘democracy’, ‘liber- 
ty’, ‘equality’, and others 
are understood differently 
in each Member State. 
disempowered to affect the EU: the size of a 
political community, if citizens are to play a 
significant role in it, matters (Bellamy 2006: 
123-124). 
The ‘EU quasi-polity’ characterised as a 
‘mixed-commonwealth’ means for  Bellamy 
(2006) the ongoing interaction between the 
polities and regimes of the Member States reflected in an EU 
that is, at the same time, national, supranational and tran- 
snational (126). For him the postnational position 
is of itself too thin to generate allegiance to any 
polity in particular and, hence, once it moves be- 
yond a general humanitarianism most commu- 
nitarians would accept, it will always have a ten- 
dency to merge into supranationalism.… [T]his 
is what happens in Habermas’ case. In seeking 
to flesh out his argument as a distinctively ‘Euro- 
pean’ [one]…his thesis loses certain of its post- 
national [cosmopolitan] credentials (Bellamy & 
Castiglione 2004: 189). 
This is because Habermas has overestimated ‘the degree 
of system and value  convergence’  within  the  EU  and  also 
‘the extent to which “political” and “national” values can be 
separated’ (Bellamy & Castiglione 2004: 190). Whatever the 
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concept used to talk about citizenship and the related polity, 
Bellamy abides always in the realm of the ‘national’ (e.g. su- 
pranational, transnational), whereas Habermas shifts atten- 
tion towards a postnational kind of citizenship and polity. 
Now given that a European citizenship and a polity of 
sorts already exist, what colour should they take, cosmopoli- 
tan communitarianist or postnational? I explore this in the 
following section. 
EU citizenship: an analogical reading 
he criterion I suggest for assessing the normative value 
of the two contending proposals is the desire of the 
great majority of Europeans to have a Europe ‘united 
in diversity’, as synthesised in the EU motto. But how should 
this motto be interpreted? Is it different, for instance, from 
the United States’ e pluribus unum? I would like to suggest an 
interpretation of the EU’s motto – and consequently also its 
citizenship, identity and polity – that is ‘analogical’, (Beuchot 
2004, 2005a). 
Beuchot has applied analogy to the interpretation of lin- 
guistic or non-linguistic (Ramberg & Gjesdal 2005) expres- 
sions. Based among others on certain classical and contem- 
porary thinkers (Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Heidegger, 
Pierce, Wittgenstein, Paz, Gadamer, Eco, Ricoeur), Beuchot 
has sought to offer a middle ground between two opposing 
theories of interpretation: univocism and equivocism (Beu- 
chot 2005a). 
Univocist interpretation would have been used in classical 
positivism (Mill), neo-positivism (Carnap) and logical posi- 
tivism (Quine, Putnam). Equivocist interpretation would be 
found in romanticism (Schleiermacher) and relativism (Ni- 
etzsche, Foucault, Rorty, and Derrida) (Beuchot 2004, 2005a, 
2005b, 2006).  Beuchot’s position lies in between. Against 
univocism, he denies that there is a unique and absolute in- 
terpretation of the text. But against equivocism, he does not 
concede that all interpretations are incommensurable and 
equally valid. He claims that certain interpretations are clos- 
er to the true meaning of the text than others, and that such 
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interpretations can be ordered accordingly in a hierarchy – by 
analogy (Beuchot 2006). 
For the nearly 500 million EU citizens today, their nation- 
al cultures, languages, history and political, religious and le- 
gal traditions are a treasure that the European project ought 
to cherish and respect. From the outset they joined the com- 
mon enterprise on this assumption. The overwhelming ma- 
jority of EU citizens identify first with their own nations and 
only secondarily – if at all – with Europe or (even less) the EU 
(Berglund, Duvold, Ekman & Schymick 2009; Petithomme 
2008). Most of them are happy with an EU which enhances 
– but does not substitute – their national spheres. The EU 
motto, if it is to mean anything to EU citizens, ought to re- 
flect this fact and therefore should not be read as proposing to 
make ‘one out of many ’ – a melting pot – with the stress on 
the side of unity; but rather to create a weaker unity, which 
emphasises ‘in diversity’. 
Borrowing from Beuchot’s insights I would like to sub- 
mit that EU unity, identity, citizenship and polity should be 
regarded as ‘analogical’. Analogical to what? To the national 
referents. In other words, the unity of the EU polity should       
be analogical to the one of the nations, though weaker. EU 
citizenship should provide a collective identity, a sense of 
belonging, but subordinate or additional to national citizen- 
ships. The EU polity should be less defined, centralised and 
important than the national polities. A model of  citizenship 
and political unity for Europe ought to have – in this sense – 
an analogical character. 
Having this in mind, what kind of EU citizenship (and 
associated concept of polity) ought to be promoted, postna- 
tional or cosmopolitan communitarianist? In the next sec- 
tion I will argue in favour of the latter. 
 
Cosmopolitan communitarianist 
citizenship: the lesser evil? 
ostnational citizenship seeks to free Europe from na- 
tionalism – often root of bloody conflicts – by creating 
a common demos with the related postnational polity. 
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 Under a cosmopolitan communitarianist citizenship, nation- 
alism may continue to exist, while its excesses are kept in 
check through a balance between the different demoi of the 
mixed polity. 
Starting from the premise that Europe cherishes its di- 
versity and that national traditions and values ought to be 
preserved as elements not only of cultural richness, but also 
as  the  main  source  of  the  citizens’ 
political identity, the cosmopolitan 
communitarianist option  seems 
more desirable and feasible. It does 
not  destroy  or  ‘overcome’  national 
identities  –  Europe’s  diversity  –  in 
the name of a postnational situation 
The overwhelming majority of 
EU citizens identify first with 
their own nations and only 
secondarily – if at all – with 
Europe or (even less) the EU. 
which not only does not correspond with the reality of the 
EU, but promises very weak allegiances from ordinary citi- 
zens. 
If nationalism means the pretence that people from a cer- 
tain nation are not only different from but also superior to 
others, it ought of course to be rejected. But does that render 
nation-states a thing of the past? Not necessarily. Nationality 
– as distinguished from nationalism, its excess – carries with 
it a great richness expressed in language, legal and religious 
traditions, history, political systems, and so on. Furthermore, 
nation-states have proved to be an effective form of political 
organisation. 
Postnationalists run the risk of pursuing unity by cancel- 
ling diversity. Because nationality has had excesses, they pur- 
port to uproot it altogether. Cosmopolitan communitarian- 
ism proceeds from the fact that the EU is formed of nations. 
Most Europeans draw their collective identity much more 
from their nation and region than from the EU. A project 
that understands diversity and looks for ways to coordinate 
it politically promises to be hard and messy, but so has Euro- 
pean integration been from its beginnings. That is the price 
of preserving diversity. 
True, the kind of unity that derived from postnational- 
ism could be thought of as stronger and clearer than the one 
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coming from cosmopolitan communitarianism: ‘postnation- 
al federation’ – even if grounded on an identity perceived as 
thin – sounds more defined than ‘mixed-commonwealth’ or, 
still worse, ‘quasi-polity’. Yet the latter corresponds better 
with the reality of the European project as it has unfolded 
and more importantly with the great richness of the Euro- 
pean nations: ‘the peoples of Europe’. 
However, if collective identity is a problem in the case 
of postnationalism, which proposes to create a postnational 
demos, it becomes an even more acute difficulty in the case 
of cosmopolitan communitarianism. How can unity exist 
among different peoples without them fusing into a single 
people? How can the national citizen remain such and still 
have some allegiance to a larger political community? How 
can a mixed commonwealth that encompasses several peo- 
ples still be one? And what kind of identity would it have? 
This problem is considered in the next and last section. 
 
Challenges: unity, identity and 
the common language 
he cosmopolitan communitarianist option, as we have 
seen, is messy and imperfect. It does not create a clear-  
cut polity with a proper name. It is not ‘univocal’, to use 
Beuchot’s terminology. Neither does it, however, renounce to 
some kind of unity, to a possible commonality among diverse 
members. It is not completely ‘equivocal’. Bellamy’s ‘cosmo- 
politan communitarianism’ respects diversity, but it still pro- 
poses some kind of unity. Neither an overriding (‘univocal’) 
unity nor a completely relativised and dissolved (‘equivocal’) 
one; but an analogical unity,  with  an  analogical  citizenship 
and identity (not strong but still existent) and an analogical 
polity (polycentric and multilevelled, but still a polity or at least 
a ‘quasi-polity’). 
One of the challenges to Bellamy’s position is to specify 
how unity can be created and maintained, and if the cohesion 
of the mixed commonwealth requires some shared values or 
culture, even if in very basic terms. The implied sacrifices of 
sovereignty in this mixed polity presuppose a certain degree 
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 of unity, a supposition that others will do the same: that ‘we’  
(each EU Member State) can trust ‘them’ (the rest of Member 
States). Can such trust be grounded only on a body of treaties 
(the ‘mobile constitution’ of the EU) or do they rely on deep- 
er, pre-political moral suppositions? Friese & Wagner (2002) 
wonder if Bellamy and others are not taking agreement about 
Europeanness for granted, disregarding the 
question of any substantive orientation of 
the polity: if that is true, ‘they may indeed 
join Habermas’ (335). This could be one of 
the strongest objections to cosmopolitan 
communitarianism: if a demos is not cre- 
ated, if the demoi are maintained in their 
valuable diversity, what can unite the pol- 
The implied sacrifices of sov- 
ereignty in this mixed pol- 
ity presuppose a certain de- 
gree of unity, a supposition 
that others will do the same: 
that ‘we’ can trust ‘them’. 
ity? What will make EU citizens trust each other for the nec- 
essary arrangements and sacrifices of sovereignty that even 
this mixed-commonwealth implies? 
As we have seen, the emergence of the most basic col- 
lective identity and unity in contemporary democratic poli- 
ties is aided by the presence of a common language. But by 
definition the EU cannot have a common language because 
national languages are part of the diversity its citizens want 
to maintain. Here Beuchot’s insight might prove especially 
useful. Maybe the common language could be ‘analogical’: a 
medium for mutual understanding which performs a service 
similar to (but less strong than) national languages. 
Although this idea is too complex to fully explain here,    
I would like to offer a speculative example on how an ana- 
logical language could be conceived. At the beginning of this 
paper reference was made to Ratzinger’s idea of the Biblical 
tradition, shared by all of the Member States, as a possible 
source of common moral principles. This could be an ana- 
logical ‘language’ since it is already there, embedded in the 
national mentalities. Pera sees in the Judeo-Christian tradi- 
tion a potential ‘civil religion’ for the EU, a general conceptual 
framework of values, principles and institutions with ‘a com- 
mon feeling that gives them breathing room, cultural weight, 
and the force of custom’ (Ratzinger & Pera 2006: 94-96). 
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6 Elsewhere (Jiménez 
2010) I have investigated 
other possible sources of 
European identity,  such 
as economic prosperity, 
the international image of 
the EU as a ‘normative 
power’ and civic solidarity 
through citizens participa- 
tion in the political life of 
the EU. 
 
Ratzinger & Pera (2006) suggest that the work of mak- 
ing that common language more evident should be done ‘by 
Christians and secularists together’ from individuals to 
families, groups, associations and civil society but staying 
apart from political parties and government programs (97). 
This ‘non-denominational…religion’ is natural to the West- 
ern polity, prone to care for the citizen from cradle to grave 
and therefore to adopt and safeguard within its own public 
sphere values from the private spheres of individuals and 
groups. It would be both private and public: ‘private, because 
of the faith of the individuals who profess it’ and ‘public, be- 
cause it is the common spirit and feeling of the civil society 
that sustains it (Ratzinger & Pera 2006: 97). Pera recalls John 
Adams’ words about the American constitution having been 
‘made only for a moral and religious people’, and Ratzinger 
quotes Tocqueville as saying ‘Despotism may govern with- 
out faith, but liberty cannot’ (Ratzinger & Pera 2006: 109). 
The United States has been able to build unity upon a basic, 
non-denominational religious and moral consensus based on 
Judeo-Christian principles (Ratzinger & Pera 2006). This av- 
enue could be explored for the EU as well. 
For Weiler (2003), the role and possible usefulness of 
Christianity in the construction of Europe has received sur- 
prisingly little attention in the academic literature about 
European integration. The European project has never been 
concerned simply with the creation of a free-market region, 
but possesses the aspiration to build an ‘ethical community’. 
The Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty declared the desire 
to continue a path of civility, progress and prosperity for all 
its inhabitants. Europe’s memory, which forms the identity 
that serves as the basis for the union of its demoi upon an 
ethos and a telos, has always had the presence of Christianity. 
Christianity cannot be erased even from Europe’s contem- 
porary history. It has influenced Europe’s political culture, 
ideas, values and morality. 
The concept of a civil religion is complex and I do not in- 
tend to explain it or assess it here. I mention it as one among 
many possible answers6  to a problem that needs to be ad- 
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dressed by the cosmopolitan communitarianist perspective, 
namely the lack of a common language to unify the polity. 
Conclusion 
t is clear that EU citizenship presents features and chal- 
lenges that go beyond ordinary forms of citizenship. At the 
same time, EU citizenship is not totally foreign since it is 
embedded in national citizenships. This fact makes EU citi- 
zenship and the EU polity more difficult to grasp, because in 
part they are different from their national counterparts, while 
also being similar. This situation presents the alternatives of 
renouncing EU citizenship, translating it into a postnational 
citizenship that overrides nationalities or conceiving of it in 
a cosmopolitan communitarianist way. I have suggested that 
this latter alternative is both more desirable and feasible. 
Further, I have attempted to show how that conception of 
EU citizenship can be understood more deeply through ana- 
logical hermeneutics: EU citizenship and the related notions 
of identity and polity are both similar to and different from 
national citizenship. Their interplay is analogical and allows 
for an idea of a polity formed of peoples and polities diverse 
from each other but still united, though not as strongly as 
within the Member States. 
To say that the unity of this analogical polity can be weak- 
er than that of the national polities, however, does not solve 
the problem of finding its identity, the source of unity and 
cohesion. I have submitted that such an identity also should 
be analogical, something related to the role that languages 
perform in national polities. More than a decade ago, Weiler 
(1999) called for a renewed discussion about the ends of in- 
tegration: the ideals (peace, prosperity, supranationalism) 
and the ethos (Christianity, social responsibility, the Enlight- 
enment) that set in motion the European project. I have ad- 
vanced an example on how, perhaps the analogical language 
for the EU polity and its citizens could be drawn. 
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